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Link failures repeatedly induce large-scale outages in power grids and other supply networks. Yet,
it is still not well understood, which links are particularly prone to inducing such outages. Here
we analyze how the nature and location of each link impact the network’s capability to maintain
stable supply. We propose two criteria to identify critical links on the basis of the topology and the
load distribution of the network prior to link failure. They are determined via a link’s redundant
capacity and a renormalized linear response theory we derive. These criteria outperform critical link
prediction based on local measures such as loads. The results not only further our understanding
of the physics of supply networks in general. As both criteria are available before any outage from
the state of normal operation, they may also help real-time monitoring of grid operation, employing
counter-measures and support network planning and design.
PACS numbers: 84.70.+p, 89.75.-k, 05.45.Xt
I. INTRODUCTION
The robust operation of physical distribution and sup-
ply networks is fundamental for economy, industry and
our daily life. For instance, a reliable supply of elec-
tric power fundamentally underlies the function of most
of our technical infrastructure [1–6]. In periods of high
loads, the breakdown of single infrastructures such as
transmission lines can cause a global cascade of fail-
ures implying large-scale outages with potentially catas-
trophic consequences [3, 7–15]. Periods of extreme loads
are expected to become more likely in future grids as
power from renewable sources, such as wind turbines, is
often generated far away from the consumers (e.g. off-
shore) and moreover strongly fluctuating [2, 16–18]. It is
thus crucial to understand which factors limit robustness
of supply networks and in particular to identify those
links that are indispensable for network operation, com-
pare also [5, 19–24]. Are there simple characteristics in
the physics of complex supply networks to identify which
of their links are critical?
Many approaches to identify critical transmission lines
in power grids or critical links in other supply networks
fundamentally rely, for instance, on large-scale numerical
simulations of detailed models that, after a local break-
down, emulate the future dynamics of large parts of the
network [19, 25–27]. Here, we propose a complementary
approach to predict a priori which links are critical in
the sense that their failure yields larger-scale malfunction
(outage) in the network. We identify two concepts that
reveal, prior to any outage, how the network topology
jointly with the load distribution influence which links
are critical: The first relies on the link’s redundant ca-
pacity which we quantify, the second originates from a
renormalized linear response theory we derive. Based
on these theoretical insights, we propose two network-
based criteria to identify critical links. A statistical eval-
uation suggests that the new measures predict critical
links much more reliably than standard loads or flows.
II. LOADS, FLOWS, AND CRITICAL LINKS
To obtain insights into mechanisms underlying large-
scale outages and to pin down how the structure of a
network determines its vulnerability, we base our analysis
on a dynamic model of AC power grids [23, 28–30]. Sim-
pler generic models of supply networks and more complex
load flow models of engineering yield qualitatively the
same results, see appendices A 1 and B 5. The AC model
characterizes the dynamics of the power angle φj(t) by
d2φj
dt2
= Pj − αdφj
dt
+
N∑
i
Kij sin(φi − φj) (1)
for N synchronous machines j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Here,
φj(t) = θj(t) − Ωt is the phase θj(t) of unit j relative
to the grid reference phase oscillating with the grid’s cy-
cle frequency Ω, e.g. Ω = 2pi × 50 Hz, ωj = dφj/dt is
the deviation from the grid reference frequency, Pj is the
effective demand or supply (of a consumer or sink where
Pj < 0 or a producer or source where Pj > 0, respec-
tively) of unit j, α is a damping constant and the link
capacities Kji = Kij ≥ 0 are proportional to the suscep-
tance of the transmission line (i, j).
The power flow
Fij = Kij sin(φi − φj), (2)
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FIG. 1. Limits to predicting critical links by local measures. (a) Stationary loads in a coarse-grained model of the British
power grid. For three links (a, b) the loads Lab = Fab/Kab are indicated. (b) The load does not necessarily indicate whether
a local failure causes a desynchronization and thus a major malfunction. (b1) Highly loaded link (labeled ’link 1’ in panel a)
induces desynchronization and is thus critical. (b2) Moderately loaded link ’2’ still induces desynchronization and thus is also
critical. (b3) In the same network, even a more heavily loaded link ’3’ does not yield desynchronization and leaves the network
fully functional. Accordingly, link ’3’ is highly loaded but non-critical (stable). We analyze critical links for test networks
based on the topology of the British high-voltage transmission grid [10, 28]: Ten nodes are randomly chosen as generators
(, Pj = +11P0) and the others as consumers (◦, Pj = −P0), with P0 = 1 s−2. Lines connecting to generator nodes have a
larger transmission capacity Kij = 2K0 than the remaining links with Kij = K0 = 15 s
−2. See appendices A 2 and B 5) for
additional test networks.
from unit i to j is then determined via the units’ phase
difference such that the (relative) load is given by Lij =
Fij/Kij = sin(φi−φj). Stationary dynamics, as relevant
on time scales of seconds in normal operation, is then
given by a synchronized (’phase-locked’) solution with
temporally fixed phase differences φi − φj [1, 30, 32–40].
How can we identify which links are critical? The load
distribution of a given supply network in normal station-
ary operation may serve as a first hint. Due to the dis-
tributed nature of sources and sinks and the topology of
the network, some links are much more loaded than oth-
ers (Fig. 1). Intuitively, rerouting the load of a highly
loaded link should be harder than that of a less loaded
one [41, 42]. It has been shown that attacks on highly
loaded links on average have more severe consequences
than random failures (see, e.g. [9, 12]).
Interestingly, whether or not the failure of a particular
link induces network desynchronization is often not pre-
dictable by local measures such as load. In fact, single
link failures may have completely distinct consequences
for global network operation, largely independent of load:
For instance, whereas the failure of one highly loaded
link (link 1 in Fig. 1 a) may cause a desynchonization of
phases and thus a large-scale network outage (see Fig. 1
b1), the failure of a less and only moderately loaded link
(link 2) may still induce large-scale outage (Fig. 1 b2).
This notwithstanding, the failure of a third link (link 3)
that is more highly loaded than link 2, is uncritical to net-
work operation (Fig. 1 b3). So predicting outages based
on a link’s load alone may have substantial limitations.
In what follows, we classify all links of a network
into ’critical’ ones, those whose failure induces long-
term desynchronization and thus a non-functional net-
work state, and ’stable’ ones, those whose failure leaves
the network functional. In particular, we integrate the
the equations of motion (1) numerically starting from a
stationary state of normal operation (phase locking). As
it turns out, which links are critical depends jointly on the
global topological structure of a network and its collec-
tive dynamics, in particular on the link’s location within
the grid topology and the entire grid’s load distribution.
III. QUANTIFYING NETWORK
REDUNDANCY
For a supply network to remain stable, it needs suffi-
cient options for rerouting the (directed) flow Fab orig-
inally assigned to a failing link (a, b). Therefore, a suf-
ficient degree of redundancy of the remaining network
also matters to reliably detect critical links. How much
redundancy is sufficient?
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FIG. 2. Redundant capacity indicates flow rerouting options. (a) Ratio between flows and redundant capacities (color coded),
with the three links from Fig. 1 indicated by arrows. (b) Dominant rerouting paths. (b1,b2) For the two links (1, heavily
loaded) and (2, moderately loaded), the flows to be rerouted are larger than the redundant capacity. The bottlenecks on
the rerouting path are indicated by dashed red arrows. Thus |Fab/Kredab | > 1 and these links are critical. (b3) For link 3,
whereas more heavily loaded than link 2, the flow to be rerouted is smaller than the total available redundant capacity. Thus
|Fab/Kredab | < 1 and the link is stable.
To identify critical links, we quantify the redundancy
as follows: If the link (a, b) fails, the (directed) flow Fab
has to reroute over alternative paths in the network.
However, the links along these paths have only a lim-
ited residual capacity Kij − Fij to take over this flow.
We define the redundant capacity Kredab of a link (a, b) as
the maximum flow that can be transmitted from unit a
to b over the residual network excluding link (a, b) (see
appendix A 3 for an algorithm to determine it). The re-
dundant capacity is approximately given by
Kredab =
∑
paths
a→b
min
(i,j)∈a→b
(Kij − Fij) , (3)
that is, the minimum residual capacity across the links
(i, j) on a path a→ b, summed over different alternative
paths a → b in the residual network which do not share
a ‘bottleneck’, i.e. a link (i, j) where the minimum in
(3) is attained. If there is only one such path then the
expression becomes exact. We thus propose to consider
the ratio of the actual flow and the redundant capacity
as a measure to predict critical links as
|Fab/Kredab | > h ⇒ predicted to be critical,
|Fab/Kredab | ≤ h ⇒ predicted to be stable, (4)
where h is a threshold value that can be optimized for
any given specific prediction. Figure 2 compared to Fig.1
illustrate that predictions based on redundant capacity
(4) may work even for links where load-based predictions
fail.
IV. FLOW REROUTING IN LINEAR
RESPONSE
Alternatively, we analyze how general alterations of
the capacity of a single link modify the global operation
of a network. Consider a small perturbation κij of the
network capacities at a single link (a, b) such that K ′ij =
Kij + κij with κab = κba = κ and κij = 0 for all other
links. This perturbation induces a change φj → φ′j of the
steady state phases of the network.
Expanding the perturbed steady state (φ¨′j = φ˙
′
j = 0
in Eq. (1)) to first order in the response ξj := φ
′
j − φj
and subtracting the unperturbed steady state condition
yields∑
i
Kij cos(φi−φj)(ξi−ξj) = −
∑
i
κij sin(φi−φj). (5)
During normal operation, we can assume that |φi−φj | ≤
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FIG. 3. Renormalized linear response theory predicts criti-
cal links. (a) Renormalized linear response not only predicts
which links are critical (red squares) and which are stable
(green disks), it also accurately tells the maximum loads for
stable links (solid line, no fit parameter). (b) Response as
a function of the load Lab of the failing link does grow pro-
portionally to the load, but also depends on other factors.
(c) Response grows proportionally to the overlap |q · v2| with
the Fiedler vector. The solid straight line with slope slope
1/λ2 gives a strict lower bound see Eq. (10). Networks and
parameters as in Fig. 2.
pi/2 for all links in the network [40] and thus use (2) to ob-
tain the identity Kij cos(φi − φj) =
√
K2ij − F 2ij =: K˜ij .
This quantity characterizes the available capacity that
the network may use to respond to perturbations in terms
of the network topology and the original flows. We define
the Laplacian matrix [43] Λij := −K˜ij + δi,j
∑
n K˜in, of
this available capacity using the Kronecker-delta symbol
(δx,y = 1 if x = y and δx,y = 0 otherwise). With the vec-
torial components qi = (δi,a− δi,b), equation (5) is recast
into the form Λξ = κLab q . We remark that this equa-
tion is linear but depends nonlinearly on the system’s
unperturbed state variables φi. Using the Moore-Penrose
pseudo-inverse T := Λ+, yields the phase responses
ξ = κLabTq . (6)
Thus the power flow (2) in the perturbed network is to
first order in κ given by
F ′ij = (Kij + κij) sin(φi − φj + ξi − ξj)
= Fij + κ ηij←ab , (7)
where we have defined the link susceptibility ηij←ab :=
Lab× [K˜ij(Tjb−Tja−Tib +Tia) + (δiaδjb− δjaδib)]. So if
capacities are perturbed slightly, eqn. (7) tells us, to first
order in the perturbations κ, which flows increase, which
decrease and how much.
Even for perturbations κ that are not small, this lin-
ear response argument reliably predicts where the flow is
rerouted (see appendix A 4 for a detailed analysis). To
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FIG. 4. Improved quality of critical link prediction. A
Receiver operating characteristic curves indicate a multi-fold
increase in prediction quality using the classifiers (4) and (9)
in comparison to load or flow. (Statistics for 66000 links from
400 random grid realizations; model, topologies and parame-
ters as in Figure 1)
accurately also predict the magnitude of the flow change
for a large perturbation of total link failure, we self-
consistently renormalize the linear response by replacing
κ := −Fab/ηab←ab , thereby ensuring that the flow of the
defective link vanishes, F ′ab = 0. From this renormal-
ized linear response theory, the modified estimates for
the rerouted network flows read
F ′′ij = Fij −
ηij←ab
ηab←ab
Fab. (8)
The F ′′i,j do of course depend on the considered link (a, b),
that for clarity does not explicitly appear as an index.
Related measures are used in engineering where they are
referred to as line outage distribution factors [44].
As the rerouted total flows on each link must not be
larger than the respective link capacities, we propose the
predicted maximum load max(i,j) |F ′′ij/Kij | as a discrimi-
nating measure between critical and stable links:
max
(i,j)
|F ′′ij/Kij | > h ⇒ predicted to be critical,
max
(i,j)
|F ′′ij/Kij | ≤ h ⇒ predicted to be stable. (9)
In addition, every bridge is predicted to be critical.
This renormalized linear response theory does not only
well identify which links are critical and which are stable,
based on criterion (9); the fundamental equation (8) also
predicts the value of the expected maximum load across
the network (Fig. 3a).
V. LOAD AND TOPOLOGY CO-ACT
The response ξ as explicated by (6) and thus the sus-
ceptibility η are directly proportional to the load Lab of
a link. The load of a link thus does determine its rele-
vance, but other collective characteristics of the network
are equally important.
5For heavy loads, some of the responsive capacities K˜ij
tend to zero and the associated network becomes weakly
connected. The second eigenvalue λ2 of the Laplacian
Λ, which measures the algebraic conenctivity becomes
small (while λ1 ≡ 0, independent of the network and
operating state) [43]. Then the pseudo-inverse T = Λ+
is dominated by 1/λ2 and the response is given by
ξ ≈ κLab
λ2
(v2 · q)v2 , (10)
up to terms of order 1/λ3. Here, v2 denotes the eigenvec-
tor associated with λ2. Thus the response is specifically
also determined by two intrinsically collective properties
of the load distribution: the inverse algebraic connectiv-
ity 1/λ2 and the overlap (v2 · q), which is large for links
connecting different components of the network [31, 45].
Direct numerical simulations confirm these theoretical
predictions, Fig. 3 b,c.
VI. QUALITY OF CRITICAL LINK
PREDICTIONS
The two proposed classifiers (4) and (9) enable the pre-
diction of critical links with high accuracy. To test the
performance we generate 400 random network realiza-
tions varying the generator positions, thereby analyzing
66000 links in total. A quantitative assessment of the dif-
ferent classifiers is provided by a receiver operating char-
acteristic (ROC) curve, Fig. 4, displaying the fraction of
correct predictions of critical links (the sensitivity) as a
function of the fraction of false alarms (the false positive
rate) when the discrimination threshold h is varied. We
see that the two classifiers introduced in this paper closely
approach the perfect operating point (0, 1) with almost
no false alarms and alsmost perfect sensitivity (Fig. 4).
The total number of incorrect predictions, including false
alarms and missed critical links, is as small as 395 (0.6
percent) for the the linear response measure and 920 (1.4
percent) for the linear response measure. Thus it is pos-
sible to reduce the incorrect predictions based on loads
(3149, 4.7 percent) and flows (2937, 4.5 percent) by a
factor of more than seven, thereby drastically improving
performance. Additional macroscopic quantifiers such as
those based on the area under the ROC-curve confirm
this view for a variety of different network topologies (see
appendix B 5)
VII. DISCUSSION
In summary, we link the overall network topology with
the load distribution resulting from the collective net-
work dynamics and present non-local relations to iden-
tify a network’s response to link failures. On this basis,
we propose two network-based strategies to identify criti-
cal links by (i) quantifying the redundant capacity of the
network and by (ii) estimating the flow rerouting through
developing a renormalized linear response theory. The
analysis suggests that the two proposed predictors are
well suited to identify critical links. In particular they
provide a substantial improvement of the quality of pre-
dicting critical links compared to predictions based on
local measures such as a link’s load. We emphasize that
the quality of prediction is evaluated by statistical mea-
sures whereas the predicting measures are derived from
insights about the topological connectivity and the non-
linear dynamics of the networks.
By construction, the proposed criteria readily general-
ize to other network topologies, to the physics of generic
linear supply networks and to complex load flow models
as standard in engineering (see appendices A 1 and B 5).
For network operation, the proposed predictors may pro-
vide key hints for initial analysis, because they suggest
which links require special attention, e.g. in detailed
large scale simulations of power grid engineering. In par-
ticular, our insights about collective influences indicate
that the weak spots of a network are not necessarily given
by the most heavily loaded elements (cf. [9, 12]) and that
network-based rather than local measures provide suit-
able guidelines for the security assessment of real-world
power grids (cf. [19]).
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Appendix A: Alternative Models and Methods
1. Models for power grid operation
In this section we review different models for the sim-
ulation and analysis of power grids.
a. Power flow in AC grids
In an AC power grid the voltages and currents oscillate
sinusoidally with period T and angular frequency ω =
2pi/T ,
U(t) = Upeak cos(ωt+ θU ) =
√
2<(Ueiωt),
I(t) = Ipeak cos(ωt+ θI) =
√
2<(Ieiωt), (A1)
where we have defined the complex -valued amplitudes
U =
Upeak√
2
eiθU , I =
Ipeak√
2
eiθI . (A2)
6The electric power is oscillating, too. The net trans-
ferred energy per period is called the real or active power,
P =
1
T
∫ T
0
U(t)I(t) = <(U I∗). (A3)
The imaginary part Q = =(U I∗) describes the power
which is temporarily stored in capacities or inductances
and is referred to as the reactive power. Furthermore,
one defines the apparent power S = P + iQ = U I∗.
These relations show that the relative phases of voltages
and currents are essential for the power flow in a grid.
Calculations are performed most easily using the com-
plex notation defined here. In the following we drop the
underline to keep the notation simple.
Consider a power grid with k, ` = 1, . . . , N nodes. The
basic relation between voltage at the nodes and the cur-
rents between them is Ohm’s law,
Ik` =
1
Zk`
(Uk − U`) = yk`(Uk − U`), (A4)
where Zk` is the impedance and yk` = 1/Zk` the admit-
tance of the transmission line between the nodes k and
`.. The admittance is divided into its real part, the con-
ductance, and its imaginary part, the susceptance,
yk` = gk` + ibk`. (A5)
In case there are multi-circuit transmission lines we as-
sume that yk` is the sum of the admittances of the single
circuits and yk` equals zero if no transmission line exists.
The total current injected to the node k is then given by
Ik =
∑
`
Ik` =
∑
`
yk`(Uk − U`). (A6)
For actual calculations it is convenient to introduce the
nodal admittance matrix Y,
Yk` = Gk` + iBk` =
{∑N
n=1
ykn if k = `;
−yk` if k 6= `,
(A7)
Ohm’s law can then be rewritten in a vectorial form,
which yields the network equation
~I = Y ~U (A8)
with ~I = (I1, I2, ..., IN ) representing the complex currents
injected into N nodes, ~U = (U1, U2, ..., UN ) denoting the
complex voltages.
The apparent power injected to a node k is then given
by
Sk = UkI
∗
k (A9)
=
N∑
`=1
|Uk||U`| (Gk` − iBk`) (cos θk` + i sin θk`) ,
where θk` = θk−θ` denotes the difference in phase of the
complex voltages Uk and U`. The effective and reactive
power are then again given by the real and imaginary
part of this expression [44, 46],
Pk =
N∑
`=1
|Uk||U`| (Gk` cos θk` +Bk` sin θk`) , (A10)
Qk =
N∑
`=1
|Uk||U`| (Gk` sin θk` −Bk` cos θk`) . (A11)
b. An oscillator model for power grid operation
We model the power grid as a network of N rotat-
ing machines representing, for instance, wind turbines, or
electric motors. Each machine k = 1, . . . , N is character-
ized by the mechanical power Pmechk acting on it, which is
positive for a generator and negative for a consumer. The
state of a machine is determined by its angular frequency
and the rotor or power angle θk(t) relative to the refer-
ence axis rotating at the nominal grid angular frequency
ω0 = 2pi × 50 Hz or ω0 = 2pi × 60 Hz, respectively. Cor-
respondingly, ωk = dθk/dt gives the angular frequency
deviation from the reference ω0. The dynamic of the ro-
tor is governed by the swing equation [28–30, 47, 48]
Mk
d2θk
dt2
+Dk
dθk
dt
= Pmechk − P elk , (A12)
where P elk is the electrical power that is transmitted to
or from other rotating machines. The parameter Mk is
the moment of inertia of the rotor times ω0 and Dk mea-
sures the damping, which is mainly provided by damper
windings. If a generator is decoupled from the grid in an
uncontrolled way such that P elk = 0, it accelerates until
finally an emergency shut-down is performed.
For simplicity we here neglect ohmic losses in the grid
such that the line admittance is purely imaginary, Yk` =
iBk`. Furthermore, we assume that the magnitude of the
voltage is constant throughout the grid, |Uk| = U0 for all
nodes k = 1, . . . , N . For a common two-pole synchronous
machine the phase of the voltage equals the mechanical
phase of the rotor. The expression (A10) for the active
electric power then simplifies to
P elk =
N∑
`=1
U20Bk` sin(θk − θ`). (A13)
Substituting this result into the swing equation yields the
equations of motion
Mk
d2θk
dt2
+Dk
dθk
dt
= Pmechk −
N∑
`=1
U20Bk` sin(θk − θ`).
(A14)
Using the abbreviations
Pk =
Pmechk −Dkω0
Mk
, αk =
Dk
Mk
,
Kk` =
U20Bk`
Mk
,
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FIG. 5. Equivalent circuit diagram explaining the internal
voltage drop in a synchronous machine.
the oscillator model reads
d2θk
dt2
= Pk − αk dθk
dt
+
N∑
`=1
Kk` sin(θ` − θk) . (A15)
These equations of motion are equivalent to the
structure-preserving model [29] in power engineering.
The model is mathematically equivalent, but derived
from slightly different assumptions. Notably, the model is
also very similar to the so-called Kuramoto model, which
is studied extensively in statistical physics [49–51]. In the
Kuramoto model the inertia term is absent such that it
can be viewed as the over-damped limit case.
c. Including voltage dynamics
The oscillator model can be extended to include the
dynamics of the local voltages, which yields the so-called
third-order model [47, 48, 52]. The equations of motion
for the mechanical motion of the synchronous machines
is still given by equation (A15) but the coupling strength
becomes time-dependent via the local voltages
Kk`(t) =
Bk`
Mk
U
(q)
k (t)U
(q)
` (t). (A16)
The equations of motion for the voltages can be derived
from Faraday’s and Ohm’s law applied to the voltages,
currents and fluxes of the stator and rotor windings of
a synchronous generator. Assuming again lossless trans-
mission lines one obtains
Tk
dU
(q)
k
dt
= U
(f)
k − U (q)k −∆X(d)k I(d)k
= U
(f)
k − U (q)k −∆X(d)k
N∑
`=1
Bk` cos θk`,(A17)
where U
(f)
k is the voltage of the field windings and ∆X
(d)
k
is determined by the transient and static reactances of the
stator windings. The actual derivation of this formula
can be found in the literature [47, 48, 52] such that we
do not go into detail here. Instead we briefly discuss the
mathematical structure of the equation.
If the phase differences θk` would be constant in time,
then the equation of motion (A17) would just describe
an exponential relaxation to the equilibrium value
U
(q)
k = U
(f)
k −∆X(d)k
N∑
`=1
Bk` cos θk`, (A18)
which can be understood in terms of the equivalent cir-
cuit diagram shown in Fig. 5. The equilibrium voltage
U
(q)
k seen by the grid is given by the source voltage U
(f)
k
reduced by the internal voltage drop over the reactance
∆X
(d)
k . The relaxation time Tk is given by the ratio of the
inductance and the ohmic resistance of the field windings
as in a resonant circuit.
However, the phase differences θk` are not constant in
time but again depends on the voltages. This gives rise to
a complex interplay of phase and voltage dynamics and
new potential instabilities as discussed in [52].
d. Load flow calculations
Load flow calculations are routinely carried out in
power engineering. They include ohmic losses and reac-
tive power but are generally static. Hence they describe
the steady state operation of a power grid but not the
dynamics of a major outage.
In load flow calculations a system of algebraic equa-
tions describing the complex power flows through the
transmission lines in the network is established. Such
an equation system can be formulated when the network
topology, the amount of power supply and consumption
at each node, as well as the admittance of each trans-
mission line are known. Solving the equation system nu-
merically, one obtains information about the steady state
operation of a power grid. Critical states of a power grid
occur when either the equation system does not have a
solution or the load of a transmission line exceeds a limit-
ing value which depends on the line parameters. Such an
overload generally does not lead to an immediate desyn-
chronization of the grid but to an overheating or bending
on longer time scales and eventually to an emergency
shut down.
In the following we present a short derivation of system
of equations that represents the load flow model [44, 46].
Within the load flow model we distinguish three types
of nodes: generator buses (PV buses), load buses (PQ
buses) and slack buses. PV buses are connected to gen-
erators, therefore their active power P and their voltage
magnitudes |U | are fixed. PQ buses are connected to
loads, i.e. their net injected active power P and reactive
power Q are given, while the voltages at these nodes are
unknown. A special kind of bus is the slack bus. It does
not exist in reality, but is introduced to facilitate numer-
ical computation. Active power P and reactive power Q
of the slack bus remain unspecified in order to balance
the active and reactive power in the system during the
iteration towards the steady state solution. The physical
reason for this is that the power losses on the transmis-
sion lines are not known a priori, i.e. before the solution
is obtained. The slack bus acts as an ideal voltage source
and ensures the power balance of the grid. Table I sum-
marizes given and unknown variables that characterize
the different types of buses.
Suppose we are interested in a power transmission net-
8P Q |U | θ
PV bus known unknown known unknown
PQ bus known known unknown unknown
Slack bus unknown unknown known known
TABLE I. Characteristics of the three types of buses in load
flow calculation.
work of m generators and n loads. The unknown state
variables are the phases of all n+m nodes of the network
and the voltages of the n loads summarized in the state
vector
~x = (θ1, · · · , θn+m, U1, · · · , Un) . (A19)
Using all the known information (see Table I), we obtain
a system of 2n+m equations describing the active power
P and the reactive power Q injected to the buses (see
Eq. A10 and Eq. A11)
P1 (θ1, · · · , θn+m, U1, · · · , Un) = P sp1
...
...
Pn+m (θ1, · · · , θn+m, U1, · · · , Un) = P spn+m
(A20)
Q1 (θ1, · · · , θn+m, U1, · · · , Un) = Q sp1
...
...
Qn (θ1, · · · , θn+m, U1, · · · , Un) = Q spn .
The superscript “sp” to the variables on the right-hand
side indicates that the values of this variables are speci-
fied beforehand. We thus have a system of 2n+m non-
linear algebraic equations for 2n+m unknown variables
~x.
A common and effective way to solve this equation sys-
tem is to use the Newton-Raphson method [47], which it-
eratively updates the state vector ~x from an initial guess
towards the solution of Eqs. (A20). The final solution for
the state vector describes the state of the power trans-
mission network in normal, steady-state operation.
e. The DC approximation and linear flow models
When the loads and losses in a power grid are small,
then the load flow calculations can be simplified consid-
erably [44, 46, 53, 54]. Within the so-called DC approx-
imation one first neglects all ohmic losses such that the
admittance of a transmission line is purely imaginary,
Gk` = 0. The real power injected at node k then reads
(cf. equations (A10) )
Pk =
N∑
`=1
Bk`|Uk| |U`| sin(θk − θ`).
In a second step one assumes that the magnitude of
the voltages in the grid are fixed, typically at the refer-
ence value of the respective voltage level. Technically,
all nodes must then be considered as PV buses, such
that no equations for the reactive power must be taken
into account when solving the load flow equations. Fi-
nally, small loads imply that the phase differences across
a transmission line are small such that the sine function
can be approximated to first order as
sin(θk − θ`) ≈ θk − θ`. (A21)
The load flow calculations then reduce to a set of linear
equations
N∑
`=1
K˜k`θ` = P
sp
k , (A22)
where the coupling coefficients are defined as
K˜k` =

∑N
n=1
Bkn|Uk||Un| if k = `;
−Bk`|Uk||U`| if k 6= `.
(A23)
The simplified equation (A22) is referred to as the
DC approximation, as it is mathematically equivalent
to Kirchhoff’s circuit equation for a DC electric circuit.
Still, it describes the flow of real power in AC power
grids. Obviously, linear equations can be solved much
faster than the nonlinear load flow equations (A20). The
DC approximation is particularly advantageous when the
flow must be calculated for many different scenarios of
generation and load, because the matrix K˜ has to be
inverted only once. The limits of its applicability are
discussed in detail in [53, 54].
Notably, a mathematically equivalent model describes
the flow in hydraulic networks [55] or vascular networks
of plants [27]. In this case the model is derived as follows.
We denote the flow from node k to node ` by Fk`. The
continuity equation then reads
N∑
`=1
Fk` = Pk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (A24)
where Pk is the source or sink strength at node k. The
unique steady state is then determined by the condition
that the total dissipated power
Ediss =
∑′
k<`
F 2k`
2Kk`
(A25)
should be minimal. In this expression, Kk` denotes the
capacity of the link (k, `), which is determined by the
cross section in hydraulic of vascular networks. The
primed sum runs only over existing transmission lines, i.e.
only over links with Kk` 6= 0. Minimizing this expression
using the method of Lagrangian multipliers yields
Fk` = Kk`(θk − θ`), (A26)
9where the values of the θ` are determined by a linear
set of equations as in equation (A22) with the Laplacian
matrix
K˜k` =

∑N
n=1
Kkn if k = `;
−Kk` if k 6= `.
(A27)
2. Network Topologies
We analyze the effects of transmission line modifica-
tions and breakdowns for partly synthetic model net-
works based on the topology of different real-world power
grids. We consider the topology of the current high-
voltage power transmission grid in Great Britain with
120 nodes and 165 links [10, 28] (cf. Fig. 6) and Scandi-
navia with 236 nodes and 320 links [23] (cf. Fig. 7).
Furthermore we consider the topology of the IEEE 118-
bus test grid with 118 nodes and 179 links (cf. Fig. 8),
representing a part of the electric power system in the
Midwestern United States as of 1962 [56]. We then gen-
erate a large number of synthetic networks as a basis for
statistical analysis by randomizing generation and load
as described below.
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FIG. 6. Model power grid based on the topology of the
British high-voltage power transmission grid [10, 28]. Half
of the nodes are randomly chosen as generators () and
consumers (◦), respectively, with Pj = ±1 s−2 (homoge-
nous case). In the current example 13 bridges and 4 fur-
ther links are critical (marked by arrows). All of them are
faithfully identified using the novel predictors proposed in this
manuscript.
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0   0.25 0.5 0.75
FIG. 7. Model power grid based on the topology of the
Scandinavian high-voltage power transmission grid [23]. 21
nodes are randomly chosen as generators (), the remaining
ones are consumers (◦) (heterogeneous case). In the current
example 45 bridges and 4 further links are critical (marked by
arrows). All of them are faithfully identified using the novel
predictors proposed in this manuscript.
We note that parameters are chosen to represent a
heavily loaded power grid. Periods of such high loads are
still rare nowadays, but are expected to become much
more likely in future power systems with a large number
of strongly fluctuating renewable power sources (see, e.g.,
[18]). In such situations the grid becomes vulnerable to
the breakdown of single transmission lines as discussed
in the present paper. A prime example is the Euro-
pean power blackout on 4th November 2006 [57]. A large
amount of electric power from wind turbines was trans-
mitted from northern to south-western Europe resulting
in heavy loads of several lines. The planned shut-down
of one double-circuit line over the river Ems in Germany
was then sufficient to bring the entire grid to the tipping
point of a breakdown. In other words, this grid did not
possess enough redundant capacity Kred to securely take
over the load of the shut-down line. A coupling of the
busbars at the transformer station Landesbergen then fi-
nally triggered the blackout, in which the European grid
fragmented into three asynchronous areas.
We have performed extensive simulations of the oscil-
lator models for the three topologies described above for
two different scenarios of power generation. First, we
consider a heterogeneous case, where several large power
plants are connected to the grid. We randomly select
Ngen nodes to be the connection points of the genera-
tors, the remaining Ncon nodes are consumers. The ef-
fective power of the consumer nodes is assumed to be
Pcon = −P0, while the generator nodes have Pgen =
10
 
 
load F/K
0   0.17 0.34 0.51 0.68
FIG. 8. Model power grid based on the topology of the
IEEE 118 bus test grid [56]. Half of the nodes are randomly
chosen as generators () and consumers (◦), respectively, with
Pj = ±1 s−2 (homogeneous case). In the current example 9
bridges and 2 further links are critical (marked by arrows).
All of them are faithfully identified using the novel predictors
proposed in this manuscript.
+Ncon/Ngen × P0. The links adjacent to the generator
nodes are assumed to have a higher transmission capacity
(2 ×K0), while the remaining links have a transmission
capacity K0. In all numerical examples we set P0 = 1 s
−1
and K = 15 s−1 unless stated otherwise. In particular,
we set Ngen = 10 for the topology of the British grid
(Fig. 6) and the IEEE 118 bus test grid (Fig. 8), whereas
Ngen = 21 for the Scandinavian grid (Fig. 7). This choice
ensures that Pgen is approximately equal in all cases such
that the results are comparable.
Second, we consider a homogeneous case assuming
a more distributed power generation [23, 28]. In this
case we assume that half of the nods are generators
Pgen = +P0 and half are consumers with Pcon = −P0.
Again the positions of generators and consumers are cho-
sen randomly. All links have the save transmission capac-
ity, which we set to K0 = 4 s
−1 (British grid and IEEE
grid) and K0 = 5 s
−1 (Scandinavian grid), respectively.
We note that the flow is directly proportional to the load
for such a homogeneous network such that both quanti-
ties have the same predictive power.
In section B 6 we collect the numerical results for the
three model networks with both heterogeneous and ho-
mogeneous generation. In all cases the new methods for
the predictions of critical infrastructures introduced in
the main manuscript significantly outperform predictors
based on load, flow, topological edge-connectivity or edge
betweenness centrality. Notably, the linear response pre-
diction works even better in the case for homogeneous
networks while the redundant capacity approach per-
forms better for heterogeneous networks. The difference
becomes most apparent for the model grids based on the
topology of the Scandinavian power grid. The numerical
results thus fully confirm the findings discussed in the
main manuscript.
3. Definition and calculation of the redundant
capacity
The redundant capacity Kredab of a link a→ b is defined
as the maximum additional flow that the network can
transmit from node a to b when the link (a, b) fails. Here,
the maximum is defined in a purely graph-theoretical
way, i.e. we search for a flow which satisfies |Fij | ≤ Kij
for all i, j and flow conservation at every node. This def-
inition is purely structural and can thus be applied to
every model of a supply network. It does not take into
account whether such a flow is dynamically possible or
stable for the particular network type under considera-
tion.
Furthermore, we note that the redundant capacity is
directed, i.e. Kredab 6= Kredba . This is immediately clear
from the fact that the flow is directed. If an link (i, j) is
fully loaded in the sense that Fij = −Fji = Kij , then it
cannot transmit any additional flow from node i to node
j. However, it can transmit additional flow in the other
direction from j to i. In fact, this would lower the net
flow over the link (i, j) and thereby the load of the link.
The redundant capacity of the link (a, b) is calculated
using a modification of the Edmonds-Karp algorithm
[58]. As discussed above, Kredab 6= Kredba such that the
algorithm works with directed graphs.
Input: Capacity matrix K, Initial flow matrix F ,
link a→ b
Output: Redundant capacityKredab of the link a→ b.
Step 1: Delete the link (a, b) from the effective net-
work: Kab,Kba, Fab, Fba ← 0.
Step 2: Initialize Kredab ← 0.
Step 3: Calculate the residual capacity matrix
Kf ← K − F .
Step 4: Construct a shortest path p from a to b in
the directed graph defined by the matrix
Kf .
Step 5: If there is no path from a to b: STOP.
Step 6: Calculate the maximum available capacity
along the path p: Kfmax ← max(i→j)∈pKfij .
Step 7: Add the maximum available capacity to
the redundant capacity: Kredab ← Kredab +
Kfmax.
Step 8: Increase the flow along the path p: Fij ←
Fij +K
f
max for all links (i→ j) ∈ p.
Step 9: GOTO step 3.
This definition has been formulated for the oscillator
model, which is mainly studied in the present paper. It
can be directly applied to the third-order model intro-
duced in section A 1 c. In this case, the capacity Kij is
given by equation (A16) using the equilibrium voltages.
The concept of the redundant capacity for the pre-
diction of overloads can be easily adapted to load flow
calculations (see section A 1 d). One then has to spec-
ify whether power or current flows or both can lead to
dangerous overloads and use these quantities in the al-
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gorithm introduced above. The results are discussed in
detail in section B 5 b.
4. Linear response theory
Here we discuss the linear response theory for the pre-
diction of phases and flows in the oscillator model after
a local perturbation in more detail. We consider a small
perturbation of the network, K ′ij = Kij + κij , at a single
link (a, b):
κij =
{
κ for (i, j) = (a, b) and (i, j) = (b, a)
0 all other links.
(A28)
This perturbation induces a small change of the steady
state phases of the network φj → φ′j . We note that the
steady state is defined only up to a global phase shift
which ha no physical significance. We thus fix the global
phase as
∑
j φj = 0 =
∑
j φ
′
j and define the response
ξj = φ
′
j − φj .
The steady state of the original network is defined via
0 = Pj +
N∑
i=1
Kij sin(φi − φj) (A29)
for all j = 1, . . . , N . For the perturbed network we have
0 = Pj +
N∑
i=1
(Kij + κij) sin(φi − φj + ξi − ξj). (A30)
Expanding the flows to first order in κij and the response
ξj yields
(Kij + κij) sin(φi − φj + ξi − ξj)
= Kij sin(φi − φj) + κij sin(φi − φj)
+Kij cos(φi − φj)(ξi − ξj). (A31)
Subtracting the equations (A31) and (A30) then yields
the steady state condition to leading order in ξj with the
result
0 =
N∑
i=1
Kij cos(φi − φj)(ξi − ξj) +
N∑
i=1
κij sin(φi − φj)
=
N∑
i=1
Kij cos(φi − φj)(ξi − ξj) + κLab(δjb − δja)(A32)
for all j = 1, . . . , N . In the last step we have used the
definition of the load Lab = Fab/Kab = sin(φa − φb) and
the perturbation matrix (A28). This result can be further
simplified and analyzed by introducing the matrix
Λij :=
{ −Kij cos(φi − φj) for i 6= j
+
∑
`K`j cos(φ` − φj) i = j. (A33)
and the vector ~q with the components
qj =
 1 for j = a−1 for j = b0 else. (A34)
In a short-hand vectorial notation, equation (A32) then
reads
Λ~ξ = κLab~q. (A35)
Before we go into detail, we first have a closer look
at the matrix Λ. A steady state of the power grid model
(A14) is dynamically stable if the relation |φi−φj | ≤ pi/2
holds for all links (i, j) of the network [40, 48]. Stable
steady states which do not satisfy this relation exist only
at the boundary of the stable parameter region. We can
thus assume that during normal operation we always have
|φi − φj | ≤ pi/2 for all links such that we can use the
following relations:
cos(φi − φj) =
√
1− sin(φi − φj)2 ≥ 0
⇒ Kij cos(φi − φj) =
√
K2ij − F 2ij . (A36)
The expression
K˜ij :=
√
K2ij − F 2ij (A37)
will be referred to as the responsive capacity of each link,
i.e. the free capacity which can be used to react to the
perturbation. In this case the non-diagonal entries of the
matrix Λ are all non-positive such that Λ is a Laplacian
matrix for which many properties are known [43]. In
particular, the eigenvalues of a Laplacian matrix satisfy
0 = λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ · · · ≤ λN , where λ2 is an algebraic
measure for the connectivity of the underlying network
[45, 59]. We will make use of these relations to further
analyze the properties of the matrix Λ in section A 5.
The Laplacian matrix Λ is singular as λ1 = 0. Still,
Eq. (A35) can be solved for ~ξ as the vector ~q is orthog-
onal to the kernel of Λ which is spanned by the vector
(1, 1, . . . , 1)T . In order to formally solve equation (A35)
we can thus use the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of Λ,
which will be called T := Λ+ in the following. Thus we
find
~ξ = κLab T~q. (A38)
The power flow in the perturbed network is to leading
order given by
F ′ij = (Kij + κij) sin(φi − φj + ξi − ξj)
= Fij + κij sin(φi − φj) +Kij cos(φi − φj)(ξi − ξj)
= Fij + κijLij + K˜ij(ξi − ξj). (A39)
Inserting the results (A38) for the phase response yields
F ′ij = Fij + ηij←ab κ, (A40)
where we have defined the link susceptibility
ηij←ab := Lab ×
[
K˜ij(Tjb − Tja − Tib + Tia)
+(δiaδjb − δjaδib)
]
. (A41)
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FIG. 9. Prediction of flows by original and renormalized linear response theory. (a) Transmission line loads in the steady state
in a coarse-grained model of the British high-voltage transmission grid. (b,c) Change of flows |F ′ij | − |Fij | in the south-eastern
part of the grid after a perturbation. We analyze (b) the loss of 10 % of the transmission capacity and (c) the complete
breakdown of the marked link. The prediction by linear response theory (A40) on the left-hand side is compared to the actual
value obtained from solving the steady state condition for the original and the perturbed network on the right-hand side. Note
the different color scales.
Related methods are used in power engineering, where
they are commonly referred to as ‘line outage distribu-
tion factors’ [44]. They are used in numerical studies of
multiple line outages (N-x errors), where a full solution
of the all possible combinations of contingencies becomes
intractable [60]. In this contribution we demonstrate the
ability of this approach to predict the future dynamics
of complex supply networks and we provide a detailed
network theoretical analysis.
The equations (A38) and (A40) give the linear response
of the phases and the flows to a perturbation of a single
link of the network. Strictly speaking, the are valid only
for infinitesimally small perturbations κ. It is a priori not
clear whether these results can be extrapolated to larger
perturbation strength in order to predict the effects of a
complete breakdown of a single link.
An example of how the damage of a single transmission
line affects the flows in a power grid is shown in Fig. 9.
We compare the change of the magnitude of the flow
|F ′ij | − |Fij | predicted by linear response theory (A40) to
the actual value obtained from a numerical solution of the
steady state condition for the original and the perturbed
network. In case of a small damage where only 10% of
the transmission capacity is lost (κab = −0.1 ×Kab) we
find an excellent agreement between predicted and actual
values as expected. The situation is more complex in
case of a complete breakdown, i.e. κab = −Kab. We find
that formula (A40) reproduces the relative changes of the
flow surprisingly well. That is, linear response theory
accurately predicts where the flow is rerouted even for a
complete breakdown of a transmission line. However, the
magnitude of the flow changes is strongly underestimated
by formula (A40). Consequently, it also fails to reproduce
that the load of the defective link must vanish, F ′ab
!
= 0.
But one can easily fix this deficit by extrapolating the
results of linear response theory if we replace equation κ
by −Fab/ηab←ab. This yields the modified formula
F ′′ij = Fij −
ηij←ab
ηab←ab
Fab . (A42)
In this article, we propose to use this modified linear re-
sponse formula to predict impeding overloads which lead
to a destabilization of the grid. An example of a success-
ful application of this method is demonstrated in Figure
1 in the main manuscript. In the first example, formula
(A42) predicts that no overload occurs in agreement with
the direct solution of the steady state condition (A29).
Thus we expect that the grid relaxes to a new steady state
after the failure of the respective link. This prediction is
confirmed by a direct numerical simulation of the equa-
tions of motion. In the second example formula (A42)
predicts that secondary overloads occur after the respec-
tive transmission line failed. Indeed, numerical simula-
tions show that no steady state solution of equation exists
and that the grid becomes unstable and looses synchrony.
Furthermore, we test the quality of load prediction for
stable links in figure 10, comparing the predicted max-
imum load after the failure of a single link with the
numerically exact values. The maximum load `maxab =
maxij |F ′′ij/Kij | is predicted with great accuracy in the
majority of all cases. It is underestimated in approxi-
mately 20% of all cases.
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FIG. 10. Quality of load prediction. (a) Histogram of the
actual maximum load `maxab = maxij |F ′′ij/Kij | after a the fail-
ure of a single link and the prediction based on the linear
response result (A42). The prediction is very accurate in the
majority of all cases. Data has been collected for all stable
links in 400 test networks with the topology of the British
grid and heterogeneous generation (see section A 2 for de-
tails). (b) Histogram of the relative error of the prediction
(`maxpredicted − `maxactual)/(`maxactual).
5. Properties of the Laplacian and the
susceptibility
A deeper understanding of the results of the linear re-
sponse approach can be gained using results from graph
theory and network science. The response ~ξ is deter-
mined by the load of the perturbed link and the matrix
Λ through equation (A35). During normal operation Λ is
a Laplacian matrix for which many important properties
are known [43]. These properties are particularly useful
in order to understand how the response is determined
by the structure of the power grid.
So assume that |φi − φj | ≤ pi/2 hold for all links of
the network. Let 0 = λ1 < λ2 < · · ·λN denote the
eigenvalues of Λ and ~vn the corresponding eigenvectors.
Then the response (A38) is given by
~ξ =
κFab
Kab
N∑
n=2
1
λn
(~vn · ~q)~vn. (A43)
The term n = 1 does not contribute since we have fixed
the global phase such that
∑
j ξj = 0. This expression
shows four important properties:
(1) The response generally scales with the load of the
defective link Lab = Fab/Kab times the absolute strength
of the perturbation κ. This is confirmed by the numerical
results for a test grid shown in figure 11 (a,b). If we
fix the relative strength of the perturbation instead, as
for a complete breakdown where κ/Kab = −1, then the
response scales with the flow of the defective link.
(2) The prefactors 1/λn decrease with n. In particular
for a heavily loaded network the algebraic connectivity
λ2 is small such that the term n = 2 dominates the sum.
Then the susceptibility of all links in the network scale
inversely with the algebraic connectivity of the network
given by the eigenvalue λ2 [43, 59]. Hence, the response
and the susceptibility are large if the network defined by
the responsive capacities K˜ij is weakly connected.
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FIG. 11. The response is proportional to the load of the
perturbed link and the inverse algebraic connectivity. (a,b)
Response as a function of the load Lab of the failing link. The
response of a given network is characterized by the norm of the
phase difference ~ξ and the columns of the susceptibility η·←ab.
In addition, the phase difference is significantly enhanced if
the overlap to the Fiedler vector |~q · ~v2| is large, as indicated
by the color code. (c,d) The global response, averaged over
all links is proportional to the inverse algebraic connectivity
1/λ2. Shown is the slope of the phase response (solid line in
(a)) and the matrix norm of the susceptibility η for networks
with different valuesK0 = 10, 12, . . . , 40 s
−2 and thus different
connectivity. The network topology is the same as in Fig. 9.
(3) For a heavily loaded network, the link susceptibility
scales with the overlap |~v2 · ~q|, where ~v2 is the so-called
Fiedler vector. This is confirmed by the numerical results
for a test grid shown in figure 11 (a). The response is
enhanced if the overlap (shown in a color code) is large.
The Fiedler overlap can be interpreted as a measure
of the local algebraic connectivity of the nodes a and b.
To see this note that the Fiedler vector can be used to
partition a graph into two weakly connected components
[43, 45]. The overlap with the vector ~q is largest if the
two nodes a and b are in different components and thus
weakly connected.
To illustrate this, let us consider the limiting case
λ2 → 0, i.e. the case where the network defined by
the responsive capacities K˜ij becomes disconnected into
two fragments with N1 and N2 nodes, respectively. The
Fiedler vector then reads
~v2 =
1√
N1 +N2
(
√
N2/N1, . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
N1 times
,−
√
N1/N2, . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
N2 times
)T ,
(A44)
it is positive for the nodes in the first fragment and neg-
ative for the nodes in the other fragment. The overlap is
then given by
|~v2·~q| =
{
0 if a and b are in the same fragment√
N1+N2
N1N2
if a and b are in different fragments.
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(4) In the limit of a disconnected network the response
~ξ to a perturbation at the link (a, b) diverges if it links
the weakly-connected components. If the perturbation
occurs within one component, then the response remains
finite.
(5) On a global scale the response ~ξ and the suscep-
tibility η are essentially given by the inverse algebraic
connectivity 1/λ2 of the network. We have already dis-
cussed the importance of the term n = 2 for the response
(A43). Averaging over all possible trigger links, this term
dominates even for a strongly coupled network. To test
this proposition, we have calculated ~ξ and η for a test
grid with different values of the global coupling strength,
i.e. we write Kij = K0Aij and vary the global prefactor
K0. The numerical results shown in figure 11 (c,d) con-
firm that the norm of the response ‖~ξ‖ averaged over all
trigger links as well as the Frobenius norm of the sus-
ceptibility matrix η are almost perfectly proportional to
1/λ2.
Appendix B: Alternative identification statistics and
additional results
1. Introducing novel indicator variables
In this contribution we introduce three novel indicator
variables for distinguishing critical and stable links on
the basis of the topology of the network and its loads
prior to a line failure. All three approaches are based
on the fact that network flow must be rerouted when a
transmission line fails. We expect that this is impossible
when the ratio of flow and redundant capacity
rab = |Fab/Kredab | (B1)
as defined in A 3 is too large. Alternatively, we expect
a global breakdown, when linear response theory as in-
troduced in section A 4 predicts secondary overloads, i.e.
when the predicted maximum load
`maxab = max
(i,j)
|F ′′ij/Kij | (B2)
is too large. Additionally we test, whether a combination
of both variables
cab =
√
r2ab + `
max 2
ab (B3)
can be an even more successful indicator. We compare
the performance of these three novel indicator variables
with other indicators for the importance of links in power-
grids, namely the load Lab = |Fab/Kab|, the flow |Fab|,
the topological edge-connectivity τab and the edge be-
tweenness centrality ab [43].
Prediction or classification success does not only de-
pend on the information comprised in an indicator vari-
able, but also on the way, this information is used. In
this contribution we test all indicator variables using two
different methods of determining decision margins, i.e.
values which announce critical links: thresholding and a
naive Bayesian classifier [61, 62]. Thresholding is a very
robust approach, since it does not depend on the amount
of training data or training method. Additionally, all
considerations concerning the rerouting of network flow
support the idea that large values of the indicators rab,
`maxab and cab are linked to the criticality of links. There-
fore predictions of critical links can be made by simply
imposing a threshold h which distinguishes between in-
dicator values related to critical links or stable links. On
the other hand, a naive Bayesian classifier does not re-
quire any assumption on the system that generated the
data set or the range of suitable indicator values. Ad-
ditionally it is able to detect relations between indicator
variable and target event that are more complex than a
linear correlations.
2. Quantifying prediction success
The success of indicators and classifiers is typically
evaluated using contingency tables. A contingency
tables (see Tab. II for an example) summarizes the
numbers of occurrences nTP, nFP, nFN and nTN of four
possible outcomes of a prediction task:
True positive (TP): Link is predicted critical
and is critical.
False positive (FP): Link is predicted critical
but is stable.
False negative (FN): Link is predicted stable
but is critical.
True negative (TN): Link is predicted stable
and is stable.
Link is critical stable
predicted
nTP nFPcritical
predicted
nFN nTNstable
nTP + nFN = ncritical nFP + nTN = nstable
TABLE II. Example for a contingency table
A good indicator aims on maximizing nTP while si-
multaneously minimizing nFP. Setting these quantities
in relation to the total numbers of critical and stable
links, ncritical and nstable, one can generate receiver oper-
ating characteristics (ROC). In more detail, the fraction
of correct predictions, also called the true positive rate
or the sensitivity
SEN :=
nTP
ncritical
(B4)
is compared to the fraction of false alarms, also called the
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FIG. 12. An example for the calculation of an ROC-curve
and the area under curve (AUC).
false positive rate
FPR :=
nFP
nstable
. (B5)
If the classification depends on a threshold value h one
can plot SEN vs. FPR for different values of h to ob-
tain a ROC-curve (see Fig. 12 for an example). Mak-
ing no predictions and therefore also no false predic-
tions corresponds to the point (FPR,SEN) = (0, 0).
Classifying every link to be critical generates the point
(FPR,SEN) = (1, 1). An ROC-curve made by random
predictions consists in a straight line with slope 1 through
the origin. A perfect indicator creates an ROC-curve that
contains the point (FPR,SEN) = (0, 1). Consequently, a
classifier is judged to be the better, the nearer the ROC-
curve approaches the the point (0, 1), i.e. the upper left
corner of the plot.
Typically, summary indices such as the area under
curve (AUC) (see Figs. 12 and 19) or the distance to the
upper left corner of the ROC plot are used to compare
ROC curves of several different indicators.
3. Thresholding approach for determining decision
margins
All considerations concerning the rerouting of network
flow support the idea that large values of the indicators
rab, `
max
ab and cab occur, if the corresponding links are crit-
ical. Assuming the relation between an indicator variable
xab and the tendency of an link to be critical is linear, we
can use a simple discrimination threshold h to separate
values that predict critical links from others:
xab > h ⇒ predicted to be critical,
xab ≤ h ⇒ predicted to be stable. (B6)
More precisely, we propose two classification systems: (a)
Based on the quantification of the residual capacity de-
fined in section A 3 we propose the following classification
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FIG. 13. Receiver operating characteristic curves of different
indicators for critical and stable links. The ROC curve shows
the fraction of correct predictions of the classifier vs. the frac-
tion of false alarms for various values of the threshold value
h. The proposed classifiers rab ( ), `
max
ab (—) and cab ( )
closely approach the perfect value (FPR, SEN) = (0, 1). They
clearly outperform classification schemes based on the local
measures load Lab (−−−) and flow |Fab| (−·−). Purely topo-
logical quantites such as the the topological edge-connectivity
τab (◦) and the edge betweenness centrality ab (—) perform
even worse. Note that the ROC curve for λab consists of dis-
crere points only as the variable λab itself is discrete. The in-
set shows the entire ROC curves, while the main panel shows
a magnification around the point (FPR, SEN) = (0, 1). The
curves are based on the simulation of 400 random realiza-
tions of the British power grid with heterogeneous generation
(cf. section A 2).
system:
rab > h ⇒ predicted to be critical,
rab ≤ h ⇒ predicted to be stable, (B7)
where h is a threshold value that can be optimized for the
specific task. (b) Based on the results of linear response
theory introduced in section A 4 we propose the following
classification system:
`maxab > h ⇒ predicted to be critical,
`maxab ≤ h ⇒ predicted to be stable. (B8)
Bridges are always predicted to be critical. The variable
h denotes a threshold value that can be optimized for a
specific task.
In the current setting, the number of false positive pre-
dictions can be minimized by choosing a high value of
h, while the number of false negative predictions can be
minimized by choosing a small value of h.
The resulting ROC curves for the identification of crit-
ical and stable links are shown in Fig. 13. The proposed
classifier based on the redundant capacity (B7) and based
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(a) Link is critical stable
rab > h 8650 279 PPV = 96.88%
rab ≤ h 116 56955 NPV = 99.80%
SEN = 98.68% SPE = 99.51%
(b) Link is critical stable
rab > h 8433 0 PPV = 100.0%
rab ≤ h 333 57234 NPV = 99.42%
SEN = 96.20% SPE = 100.0%
(c) Link is critical stable
rab > h 8766 37574 PPV = 18.92%
rab ≤ h 0 19660 NPV = 100.0%
SEN = 100.0% SPE = 34.35%
TABLE III. Performance of a classification system of criti-
cal and stable links according to the redundant capacity as
defined in Eq. (B7). Contingency table for the three differ-
ent values of the threshold h optimized for different tasks:
(a) Threshold value h = 0.614 for which the ROC curve
approaches the perfect operation point (0, 1) most closely.
(b) No false positive results occur for high threshold value
h = 0.84. (c) No false negative results occur for a low thresh-
old value h = 0.0493. Results are summarized for 400 random
realizations of the british power grid with heterogeneous gen-
eration (cf. section A 2).
on linear response theory (B8) closely approach the per-
fect value (FPR,SEN) = (0, 1). They clearly outperform
classification schemes based on the local measures load
Lab and flow |Fab|. Purely topological quantities such
as the the topological edge-connectivity τab and the edge
betweenness centrality ab perform even worse (cf. also
[12]).
Finally, the threshold value h can be chosen according
to the specific application of the classification system.
A common choice is the point which has the smallest
distance to the perfect operational point (FPR,SEN) =
(0, 1). This choice represents a compromise between the
conflicting goals of large sensitivity an small false positive
rate. For the present network data set it yields the value
h = 0.614 for the classification system (B7) and h = 0.977
for the classification system (B8). In these cases, the
absolute fraction of false predictions lies below 0.75% or
1.39%, respectively (cf. Tables III (a) and IV (a)). A
different strategy would be to minimize the number of
false positive results. For the given network data this
number can be reduced to zero by choosing a high value of
h (cf. Tables III (b) and IV (b)). Notably, the sensitivity
still remains reasonably large in this case. Similarly, the
number of false negative results can be reduced to zero by
chosing a small threshold value (cf. Tables III (c) and IV
(c)). This strategy detects all critical links but also yields
a comparably large number of false positive predictions.
The results are summarized in the contingency tables
III and IV . In addition to the absolute number of true
and false predictions, we also give some statistical quan-
tities to characterize the classifier: the sensitivity (B4),
the specificity SPE := 1 − FPR as well as the positive
(a) Link is critical stable
`maxab > h 8554 708 PPV = 92.36%
or bridge
`maxab ≤ h 212 56526 NPV = 99.63%
SEN = 97.58% SPE = 98.76%
(b) Link is critical stable
`maxab > h 8238 0 PPV = 100.0%
or bridge
`maxab ≤ h 528 57234 NPV = 99.09%
SEN = 93.98% SPE = 100.0%
(c) Link is critical stable
`maxab > h 8766 19866 PPV = 30.62%
or bridge
`maxab ≤ h 0 37368 NPV = 100.0%
SEN = 100.0% SPE = 65.29%
TABLE IV. Performance of a classification system of critical
and stable links based on linear response theory as defined
in Eq. (B8). Contingency table for the three different values
of the threshold h optimized for different tasks: (a) Thresh-
old value h = 0.977 for which the ROC curve approaches
the perfect operation point (0, 1) most closely. (b) No false
positive results occur for a high threshold value h = 1.066.
(c) No false negative results occur for a low threshold value
h = 0.733. Results are summarized for 400 random realiza-
tions of the British power grid with heterogeneous generation
(cf. section A 2).
predictive value
PPV :=
nTP
nTP + nFP
and the negative predictive value
NPV :=
nNP
nTP + nFN
.
Combining the redundant capacity and the linear re-
sponse theory according to Eq. (B3) yields a combined
indicator
cab > h ⇒ predicted to be critical,
cab ≤ h ⇒ predicted to be stable. (B9)
As shown by the ROC curve in Fig. 13 the combined
indicator further improves the performance. Most im-
portantly, we can achieve a sensitivity of 100 % for the
current dataset by choosing a threshold h ≤ 0.99021. For
this choice the false positive rate is still below 2.1%. Us-
ing a threshold h = 1.28 reduces the false positive rate
to zero at a sensitivity of 96.65%.
4. A Bayesian approach for classifying critical links
In the previous Sec. B 3, values of indicator variables
are selected by imposing a threshold. This simple and
robust approach is sufficient, if the relationship between
the values of the indicator variable and the prediction
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(a) Link is critical stable
cab > h 8723 336 PPV = 96.29%
or bridge
cab ≤ h 43 56898 NPV = 99.92%
SEN = 99.51% SPE = 99.41%
(b) Link is critical stable
cab > h 8472 0 PPV = 100.0%
or bridge
cab ≤ h 294 57234 NPV = 99.49%
SEN = 96.65% SPE = 100.0%
(c) Link is critical stable
cab > h 8766 1198 PPV = 87.98%
or bridge
cab ≤ h 0 56036 NPV = 100.0%
SEN = 100.0% SPE = 97.91%
TABLE V. Performance of a classification system of criti-
cal and stable links based on the combined indicator cab as
defined in Eq. (B9). Contingency table for the three differ-
ent values of the threshold h optimized for different tasks:
(a) Threshold value h = 1.044 for which the ROC curve
approaches the perfect operation point (0, 1) most closely.
(b) No false positive results occur for a high threshold value
h = 1.289. (c) No false negative results occur for a low thresh-
old value h = 0.99. Results are summarized for 400 random
realizations of the British power grid with heterogeneous gen-
eration (cf. section A 2).
success is monotonous. A more general approach that
does not require any knowledge about the system under
study consists in classifying suitable values of indicator
variables through conditional probability density func-
tions (CPDFs), i.e., by using naive empirical Bayesian
classifiers [61, 62]. The resulting ROC curves are proper
ROC curves, i.e. , they are concave and consequently
have a monotonously decreasing slope [63]. This effect
is obtained by choosing relevant indicator values accord-
ing to the probability that the link (a, b) is critical given
a indicator value xab. To express this in formulas, we
introduce the binary event variable
χ =
{
1 : if (a, b) is critical;
0 : if (a, b) is stable.
(B10)
Decision making, i.e. here predicting criticality of the link
is then done using a probability threshold h′
p(χ = 1|xab) ≥ h′ ⇒ predicted to be critical,
p(χ = 1|xab) < h′ ⇒ predicted to be stable, (B11)
with xab denoting the value of a indicator variable com-
puted for the link (a, b). Changing h′ from the global
maximum of the CPDF p(χ = 1|xab) to 0, generates an
ROC curve starting from the lower left corner to the up-
per right.
Although this approach is mathematically well defined,
there are several (technical) issues that have an influence
on the resulting ROC curves. In general one observes an
increase in the area under curve (AUC), with increasing
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FIG. 14. Cumulative probability distribution function
(CPDF) for all indicator variables calculated for the British
grid and heterogeneous power generation. In order to cover
the wide range of indicator variables, the binning was done
using irregular bin sizes on logarithmic scales, if appropriate.
Number and size of bins were adapted such that each bin is
based on at least two counts.
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FIG. 15. ROC curves of different classifiers for critical links
using (a) the linear classifier and (b) the Bayesian prediction
scheme: the ratio rab ( ), the predicted max. load `
max
ab
(—), the combined indicator cab ( ) the flow |Fab| (− · −),
the load Lab (−−−), the edge betweenness centrality ab (—
) and the topological edge-connectivity τab (◦). The curves
are based on the simulation of 400 random realization of the
British power grid with heterogeneous power generation.
number of bins used to estimated the CPDF from a given
data set. However, allowing an arbitrarily large number
of bins leads to ROCs which are specific for the data set
under study (over-fitting) and are irreproducible when
using other data sets generated by the same system under
study. Therefore we determine the number of bins in an
adaptive way, i.e. by choosing it such that each bin of
the CPDF has at least two entries. Depending on the
range of indicator variables it can be more appropriate
to use the logarithm of a indicator variable and not the
variable itself to determine suitable binnings.
Comparing the ROC curves in Figs. 13 and 15 shows
that the Bayesian approach yields qualitatively similar
results as the linear classifier. Additionally, curves gen-
erated through the Bayesian approach are smoother since
they are proper ROC curves [63], i.e., their slope is
monotonously decreasing.
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FIG. 16. Performance of indicators for critical links in the
third order model. Simulations are carried out for model
power grids based on the topology of the British high-voltage
grid (cf. Figure 6) with half of the nodes being generators and
consumers with Pj = ±1 s−2. Shown is the ROC curve for the
different indicators: the ratio rab ( ), the flow |Fab| (−·−) ,
the edge betweenness centrality ab (—) and the topological
edge-connectivity τab (◦). Results are collected for 200 ran-
dom realizations of the network. (b) ROC curves using the
Bayesian prediction scheme.
5. Critical link identification for alternative models
a. Critical links in the third-order model
Classifying critical links based on the redundancy of
the network works extremely well also for more complex
power grid model such as the third order model intro-
duced in section A 1 c. We simulate the dynamics after
the breakdown of a single link for random model net-
works based on the topology of the British high-voltage
grid (cf. Figure 6). Half of the nodes are randomly cho-
sen to be generators or consumers with Pj = ±1 s−2.
All nodes have the nominal voltage U
(f)
k = 1.1 and we
assume Bk` = 20 for all links and ∆X
(d)
k = 1 for all
nodes (cf. [52] for the choice of parameters). The ROC
curve obtained from the simulation of 200 random net-
works (see figure 16) shows that the indicator based on
the redundant capacity significantly outperforms the in-
dicators based on the flow, topological edge-connectivity
or edge betweenness centrality.
b. Critical links in the load flow calculations
Load flow calculations are routinely carried out by the
grid operators to analyze the current state of the grid
as well as the security after the breakdown of a single
transmission line (the so-called n− 1 case). We test the
novel classification schemes for telling apart critical from
stable links for load flow calculations, including ohmic
losses and reactive power flow.
Here, we do load flow calculation for synthetic model
networks based on the topology of the British power grid.
As before we consider two scenarios for generation and
consumption. In the homogeneous scenario, we assume
that half of the nodes generate the power Pgen = P0 and
half are consumers with power demand Pcon = −P0 and
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FIG. 17. Performance of indicators for critical links in
the load flow calculations. Simulations are carried out for
model power grids based on the topology of the British high-
voltage grid (cf. Figure 6) for (a) the heterogeneous case (ten
nodes randomly selected as generators) and (b) the homoge-
neous case (half of the nodes randomly chosen as generators).
Shown is the ROC curve for the different indicators: the ratio
rab ( ), the apparent power flow |Sab| (− · −), the norm of
the complex current |Iab| (−−−), and the topological edge-
connectivity τab (◦). ROC curves are calculated using the
Bayesian prediction scheme described in Sec. B 4 using data
from 100 random realizations of the network. Bridges are
considered trivially critical.
Qcon = −0.33P0. All transmission lines are assumed to
have the same impedance Z0 = 0.1 + i 0.5 p.u.. For the
heterogeneous network, 10 of the 120 nodes are randomly
chosen as generators (Pgen = 11P0) and the rest are set to
be consumers (Pcon = −P0, Qcon = −0.33P0 as above).
The transmission lines connecting the generators to the
grid are assumed to be stronger, i.e. to have half the
impedance as the remaining ones (Z ′ = 0.5Z0). For both
networks the terminal voltage of the generators |Ugen|
is set to be 1 p.u. and we set P0 = 1MW. For these
networks we perform load flow calculations to determine
the normal operational state of the grid, commonly called
the n − 0 basis case. If no solution can be found, we
discard the random realization.
We then simulate the failure of a single transmission
line (the n− 1 case) by removing one link (a, b) from the
network. The post-fault condition of the network is then
determined by applying load flow calculations again for
the modified topology using the the pre-fault stable state
as initial condition for the solver. The grid is considered
to be stable if a solution can be found for the post-fault
topology, and the apparent power flow |Sij | carried by
each line does not exceed the security limit Kij of this
line. For better comparability with the previous sections
we refer to Kij as the capacity of the line (i, j). In other
words, the grid remains stable if none of the other lines is
overloaded when the transmission line (a, b) fails. If not,
the grid is assumed to be unstable and the transmission
line (a, b) is said to be critical.
In load flow calculations the definition of the redundant
capacity of a transmission line is slightly different from
the one for the oscillator model, since the power flow be-
tween nodes is complex. For the homogeneous network,
the transmission capacity is identical for all links, which
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FIG. 18. Performance of indicators for critical links in the
linear flow model. Simulations are carried out for model power
grids based on the topology of the British high-voltage grid
(cf. Figure 6) for (a) the heterogeneous case (ten nodes ran-
domly selected as generators) and (b) the homogeneous case
(half of the nodes randomly chosen as generators). Shown
is the ROC curve for the different indicators: the ratio rab
( ), the initial flow |Fab| (−−−), and the topological edge-
connectivity τab (◦). ROC curves are calculated using the
Bayesian prediction scheme described in Sec. B 4 using data
from 100 random realizations of the network.
is defined as 1.2 times the maximal apparent power flow
in the stable operation state in the n− 0 case,
KLF := 1.2×max
m,n
|S(n−0)mn |. (B12)
For the heterogeneous network, the transmission capacity
of the links connected to the generators KLFgen is set as 2
times the capacity of the links connecting only consumers
KLFcon: K
LF
gen = 2K
LF
con, where Kcon is defined regarding
the maximal apparent power flow on the consumer con-
necting lines maximal apparent power flow in the stable
operation state in the n− 0 case,
KLFcon := 1.2× max
consumersm,n
|S(n−0)mn |. (B13)
By this definition, each transmission line in the stable
operation state of the initial pre-fault networks is working
safely without any overload. The redundant capacity of
a transmission line Kredab is then defined by the algorithm
introduced in section A 3. The only difference is that the
flow Fij is replaced by the apparent power flow |Sij | times
the sign of the active power flow Pij , which indicates the
direction of the net power flow between nodes, i.e.
FLFij := sgn(Pij) · |Sij |. (B14)
As indicators for the criticality of a transmission line
(a, b), we test the apparent power flow |Sab|, the norm
of the complex current |Iab|, the ratio rab = |FLFab /Kredab |,
the topological edge-connectivity τab and the edge be-
tweenness centrality ab. The novel indicator based on
the redundant capacity rab shows a much better predic-
tive performance than other indicators, see Figure 17.
c. Critical links in the linear flow model
The linear flow model can be considered as the DC ap-
proximation of the load flow calculations. Therefore, the
simulation procedures and the parameter settings are ba-
sically the same, except for the following differences: (1)
The magnitude of the voltage is fixed for all nodes, while
the reactive power Qk is arbitrary. (2) Ohmic losses are
neglected such that the admittance of the transmission
lines is purely imaginary, Y0 = iB = i2 p.u.. (3) The
flows are defined as
FLiFij := Bij(θi − θj). (B15)
Similar as in the load flow calculations, a transmission
line is considered as critical when its failure causes a sec-
ondary overload of at least one other transmission lines.
The overload of a line is defined as following: the maxi-
mal flow in the network exceeds the line capacity, which
is defined for the linear flow model as
KLiF := 1.2×max
m,n
|F (n−0)mn | (B16)
for the homogeneous network and
KLiFcon := 1.2× max
consumersm,n
|F (n−0)mn |, (B17)
KLiFgen := 2K
LiF
con (B18)
for the heterogeneous networks.
The indicators we test include the magnitude of the ini-
tial flow of the lines |Fab|, the ratio of the initial flow and
the redundant capacity rab = |Fab/Kredab |, the topological
edge-connectivity τab and the edge betweenness centrality
ab. The indicator rab based on redundant capacity sig-
nificantly outperforms the other indicators (Figure 18).
6. Critical link identification on alternative
topologies
We test the performance of the novel indicators by ex-
tensive numerical simulations of the power grid dynamics
for various network topologies, as described in Sec. A 2,
using the oscillator model. In Fig. 19 we compare AUCs
for different indicators and different ways of prediction:
making random predictions, using a indicator as a linear
classifier, using a Bayesian classifier for in-sample predic-
tion and using a Bayesian classifier with separation of test
and training data set. In the later case, CPDFs were eval-
uated using 50% of the available data and ROC curves
were generated using the remaining 50%. The compo-
sition of test and training data set in terms of numbers
of bridges, stable and critical links was chosen randomly.
Mostly, linear and Bayesian approach yield comparable
results, with the linear classifier being slightly better.
This is due to the fact that the relation between the value
of the indicator variable and its prediction success is in
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FIG. 19. Summary of the performance of different indicators for various network topologies. Shown is the AUC for critical
links using the linear classification scheme (red solid lines), the Bayesian prediction scheme in sample (dark blue, dashed)
and the Bayesian prediction scheme out of sample with a separation of test and training data set (light blue dashed lines).
Confidence bounds (yellow) were estimated making random predictions. Data averaged over 400 random realizations for the
British and the IEEE grid and 200 for the Scandinavian grid, respectively.
many cases simple, such that it can be capture by a lin-
ear classifier. Estimating this relation based on CPDFs
on the other hand can be difficult, if the data is clus-
tered around one value or spread around several orders
of magnitude. Comparing prediction success, the novel
indicators rab = |Fab/Kredab |, `max and cab perform better
than common indicators in all cases studied.
A closer inspection reveals that the predicted maxi-
mum load `max performs better than the ratio rab for
the datasets with homogeneous supply, i.e. equal num-
ber of generators and consumers. One reason for this
finding could be the fact that the total number of critical
links is higher for homogeneous than for heterogeneous
supply. Furthermore we find that the performance of all
indicators is lowest for the Scandinavian grid with homo-
geneous supply. This model network is the one with the
highest fraction of critical links in total.
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